

SWISS PAPER DISCUSSES IMPLICATIONS
OF GENERAL SMITH'S TRIP TO TOKYO

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The Swiss newspaper Schweizerische Allgemeine Volks-Zeitung published in Zofingen, in its issue of 20 January 1951, carried an article on General Bedell Smith's recent trip to Tokyo.

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The Schweizerische Allgemeine Volks-Zeitung is a weekly illustrated newspaper with a circulation of 125,000. It is devoted mainly to international news and feature items, and designed for popular consumption. It pursues an independent line regarding the East-West conflict, being neither pro-American nor pro-Russian. By its very nature, it has no serious political policy.

The article follows:

CHANGES IN TOKYO HEADQUARTERS

MacArthur's Personal Rule To Be Throttled!

Behind the Scenes of the Secret Conference of the USA Supreme Commander
in the Far East With His Colleagues From Washington

Domestic Quarrels in the Secret Service

The unexpected arrival in Tokyo of the Director of CIA, the American Secret Service, undoubtedly had the effect of a small bombshell among the "inner circle" people. To those outside the periphery of the war in Korea, perhaps it has not been especially noticeable that Gen Bedell Smith, former US Ambassador in Moscow, has not yet conferred personally with General MacArthur a single time since his appointment to the head of the combined American intelligence and espionage service, as successor to Admiral Hillenkoetter. But when one considers that even men of the rank of General Bradley or even ^{of} President Truman have felt it important enough to fly over the Pacific Ocean because of the world-shaking events in the Far East during the past year, then one might indeed be puzzled that apparently neither Walter Bedell Smith nor his subordinate, General Bolling, the Army intelligence chief, felt it necessary to inform themselves about the activities of their services right on the spot. It would

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be all the more puzzling inasmuch as it was allegedly the incompetence of the American espionage network in Asia which made the surprise attack in Korea possible at all, and which was more or less directly responsible for the dismissal of Admiral Hillenkoetter from his post.

For security reasons very little has come to public attention concerning these discussions between the highest officials of the American armed forces. Now, however, after 50,000 Allied soldiers have already been sacrificed in Korea, the sad truth gradually is coming to light. It can be concluded that one of the biggest differences--of the many which have been rumored--between the Dai Ichi Building in Tokyo and the Pentagon in Washington arises from the competition among the secret services.

Each His Own Boss?

The almost psychopathic obsession of MacArthur, the "true emperor of Japan," to be master in his own house, or at least in the house that is assigned to him, had led him, shortly after the Allied entrance into Tokyo, to separate ^{completely,} in effect, his intelligence service in the Far East from the headquarters in Washington. In his victorious blaze of glory it was easy for the General to take it on himself to run all Asiatic affairs, and above all to install his devoted comrades-in-arms in all the important posts in Japan. Major General Willoughby, the "Bantam boy," as intelligence chief of the headquarters in Tokyo, took on responsibilities which far outstripped the normal functions of his rank and which robbed the CIA (Hillenkoetter) in Washington of all rights of participation.

Then came the attack on South Korea--an indication ^{of} the worst sort of weakness for American espionage. After MacArthur covered his friend Willoughby on the strength of his own prestige, Hillenkoetter had to suffer the role of scapegoat. In any case, at the end of July the headquarters in Tokyo finally granted CIA agents full freedom of movement in CIA's area of responsibility. This was done reluctantly enough, but Bedell Smith had made this concession one of the prerequisites for his taking his job.

However, with the successful landing at Inchon and with the taking of Seoul

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by MacArthur's troops, this step was once again more or less nullified. The Generalissimo felt himself again strong enough to buck Washington on this point. BeColl Smith had to turn to Willoughby if he wanted to undertake anything in the Pacific.

MacArthur's Shattered Prestige

Only the tragic, ill-fated "home by Christmas" offensive by the Eighth Army in November and the headlong retreat following that announcement again gave Washington the upper hand. There was no longer any equivocating about the weakness (to use a euphemism) of the intelligence service in Tokyo. It is true that other reasons were advanced for the Chinese "surprise" and the American flop: the too strong reliance of the US divisions on the main highways and on reserves, the poor training in Japan in past years, and the lack of discipline and will to fight. But the circumstance that some 200,000 well-equipped Chinese were able to attack practically unnoticed contradicted everything that had been predicted up to then.

The loss to MacArthur's prestige resulting from this can be measured only gradually. Today, it is not only the far-off voices in the US which criticize the Supreme Commander, but even erstwhile admirers immediately around him. A man like Homer Bigart, one of the oldest, most experienced, and most famous of the American war correspondents, who from the beginning went right along with everything in Korea, and who by special permission of General MacArthur was allowed free entry to the Dai Ichi Building in Tokyo, declared openly that the US could not allow itself to be dragged along any longer by the aging General.

"It is a great tragedy," wrote Bigart at the end of a well-known article, "that a man who has served his country so nobly and well must at the end of his career be slandered. This fate belongs to the hazards of the profession of military leadership."

However that may be, the headquarters in Tokyo in the last few days and weeks has taken on many noteworthy changes which clearly show the growing influence of Washington. For the first time in many years MacArthur must accommodate himself to not passing out personal commentary on the international situation in connection with the Korean crisis. An extremely sharp censorship, very unusual

for him and for his subordinates, has been clamped on all correspondents' reports. Lieutenant General Ridgway, the new commander of the Eighth Army, is a personal friend of General Bradley and General Collins. And last but not least, with the arrival of Bedell Smith and Bolling in the Far East, a split of many years' standing which already had caused much damage and which arose presumably out of reasons of prestige exclusively has been repaired. It is to be hoped that the mixed-up situation will now clear up to some degree.

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REMARKS:

Attached hereto Swiss newspaper report on General Smith's trip to Tokyo. No other distribution is being made.

Noted

L.K.F.